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OREGON v. ELSTAD REVISITED: URGING STATE
COURT JUDGES TO DEPART FROM THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT'S NARROWING OF MIRANDA
Claudia R. Barbieri*
INTRODUCTION

Imagine an average young man on the threshold of adulthood, living in a medium-sized town in a middle-class family. Still in his early years, he gets into a
little local trouble and one day finds the police at his door. They ask him questions about a burglary. He panics, and as he racks his brain for some scrap of
legal knowledge that might get him out of this frightening situation, he admits
that he knows about the crime, stating he was there. The police become more
persistent, telling him they know about his involvement, asking him if he wants to
talk; finally they read him his Miranda rights. Confused and afraid, he confesses
again. The United States Supreme Court believes that this young man understood the Miranda warnings at this crucial moment, waived them with a voluntary
confession; thus he sealed his own fate.
Twenty years after the U.S. Supreme Court established the Fifth Amendment
prophylactic safeguards in Miranda v. Arizona,1 the Burger Court in Oregon v.
Elstad2 gave the doctrine a narrowing blow. While Elstad was in their custody,
and prior to their administering Miranda warnings, the police solicited a statement from Elstad. After the Miranda warnings were administered and Elstad
ostensibly waived his rights, he confessed again. 3 The Court reasoned that admission into evidence of a confession made after Miranda warnings that stems from
statements made prior to the warnings does not offend the Self-Incrimination
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.4 The Court reasoned that a simple failure to
administer Miranda warnings absent police coercion does not so taint subsequent
* J.D., University of the District of Columbia School of Law. expected 1999. 1 gratefully acknowledge University of the District of Columbia School of Law professors Milton C. Lee, Jr. and
Laurie Morin and District of Columbia Public Defender Gretchen Franklin for their valuable input on

this article. I also would like to express my deepest gratitude to my family and friends, most especially
Barbara, John, Anne Marie, Dean, Kim and Cliff for their unending support and encouragement. This
article is dedicated to my grandmother, Ruth P. Barbieri. who passed away on December 30. 1997.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that confessions made as a result of policeinitiated custodial interrogations are inadmissable unless suspects are advised of. and then knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waive their constitutional rights.
2 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
3 Id. at 302.
4 Id. at 318.
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confessions as to justify excluding the prior confession. To hold otherwise, the
Court concluded, would create an unwarranted extension of Miranda.'
Elstad was decided by a 6-3 majority with Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens in the minority. Considering the incumbent bench of the Rehnquist Court,6
it is unlikely that this decision and the present conservative view towards criminal
defendants' rights-including the privilege against self-incrimination-will
change in the foreseeable future. Because Elstad narrows the scope of Miranda
and eviscerates basic Fifth Amendment protections, state courts should turn to
their own constitutions to discover a continued vibrancy of criminal procedural
safeguards to combat the coercive and deceptive police tactics inherent in custodial police interrogations. Because police investigations often include custodial
interrogations, criminal defense attorneys likely will frequently find themselves
confronted with Elstad-like situations.
Well aware of Elstad's narrowing effects, several states have departed from
Elstad's dramatic decision by implementing their own state constitutional law.
State courts are free to place greater restraints on state police activity than the
federal constitution if the states' decisions are based on state law and are not in
conflict with federal law.7 If prompted, state courts may choose to interpret their
respective state constitutions more broadly. 8 This article examines how Elstad
narrowed the scope of Miranda and, after exploring the Elstad decision, will show
how three states chose not to follow the decision.9 Further, this article urges
state courts to develop state constitutional law consistent with the values of the
Fifth Amendment of the federal constitution.
I.

OREGON V. ELSTAD

A residential burglary and a local tip directed police to eighteen-year-old
Michael Elstad's home.' 0 Without administering Miranda warnings, police questioned Elstad alone." Elstad acknowledged he had heard about the burglary,
and, after an officer stated that he thought Elstad was involved, Elstad said, "Yes,
5

470 U.S. at 307, 309.

6 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, Stevens,
Souter and Thomas.

7 See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983). (The Supreme Court has stated that "a
State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those in
this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards"). Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S.
714, 719 (1975).
8 Timothy R. Lohraff, United States v. Leon and Illinois v. Gates: A Call for State Courts to
Develop State ConstitutionalLaw, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 311 (discussing the state constitutional trend
and interpreting state constitutions more broadly).
9 State v. Smith, 834 S.W.2d 915 (Tenn. 1992); Commonwealth v. Smith, 593 N.E.2d 1288 (Mass.
1992); State v. Pebria, 938 P.2d 1195 (Haw. App. 1997).
10 470 U.S. at 300.
11 Id. at 301-01.
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I was there." 12 Elstad was then taken to the police station and read his Miranda
rights.13 Elstad waived his rights,1 4gave police a signed confession, and was
charged with first degree burglary.
At trial, Elstad moved to suppress his oral statement and confession and argued that his initial statement "let the cat out of the bag."' 5 The motion was
denied resulting in Elstad's conviction, but the Oregon Appeals Court reversed
his conviction. 16 The Oregon Appeals Court, relying on the cat-out-of-the-bag
theory, reasoned that the confession after the Miranda warnings should have
been excluded in addition to the statements made prior to the warnings.17 However, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment does not require
the "suppression of a confession, made after proper Miranda warnings and a
valid waiver of rights, solely because the police had previously elicited a statement from the defendant without warnings."' 8 In addition, when only a Miranda
violation exists, "a careful and thorough administration of Miranda warnings
serves to cure the condition that rendered the unwarned statement inadmissible."'19 The U.S. Supreme Court's message was clear: a voluntary waiver removes
the taint of a prior Miranda violation. 20 Most significantly, the Court stated that
moral and psychological pressures to confess, absent police coercion, are not considerations of the Fifth Amendment. 2 1
I.

THE CONTROVERSY

In Miranda, the Warren Court recognized the need to implement procedural
safeguards for criminal defendants in order to curb police coercion while trying to
elicit confessions. 22 Contrary to the Miranda principles, however, Elstad's implied message is that absent police coercion, an incriminating statement derived
from a Miranda violation is admissible. 23 In practical terms, the Elstad decision
fosters deceitful police tactics by allowing an officer to elicit a confession from a
12
13
14
15
16

Id. at 301.
Id.
Id. at 301-02.
Id. at 302.
Oregon v. Elstad, 658 P.2d 470 (Or. App. 1983) (holding that "regardless of the absence of

actual compulsion, the coercive impact of the unconstitutionally obtained statement remains, because
in a defendant's mind it has sealed his fate."). Id. at 555.
17 Id. at 555 (holding that "the cat was sufficiently out of the bag to exert a coercive impact on
defendant's later admissions. It was error not to suppress the typewritten confession").
18 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 301, 303.
19 Id. at 310-11.
20 Id. at 316.
21 Id. at 304-05.
22 Miranda, 384 U.S. 436,443-45 (1966). See Ottis H. Stephens. Robert L Flanders. & J.Le is
Cannon, Law Enforcement and the Supreme Court: Police Perceptions of the Miranda Requirements,

39 TENN. L. Rev. 407 (1972).
23

Elstad, 470 U.S. 298.
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suspect before administering Miranda warnings. After a suspect makes an incriminating statement, police can administer Miranda warnings expecting a repeat confession which will be admissible in court.24
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Elstad, protested the majority's interpretation of the Miranda safeguards. 25 Brennan maintained that the Court has
engaged "in a studied campaign to strip the Miranda decision piecemeal and to
undermine the rights Miranda sought to secure.",26 Furthermore, Brennan disagreed with the majority's dismissal of the U.S. v. Bayer27 premise that initial
28
incriminating statements so taint subsequent ones, that they are inadmissible.
"In such a sense, a later confession always may be looked upon as fruit of the
first.",29 The Bayer Court recognized that "[a]fter an accused has once let the cat
out of the bag by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed.""0
Justice Brennan also noted that the majority "adopt[ed] startling and unprecedented methods of construing constitutional guarantees" in this decision, that
"mischaracterize our precedents, obfuscate the central issues, and altogether ignore the practical realities of custodial interrogation."'" In addition, Justice
Brennan noted that even standard interrogation manuals used by law enforcement agencies recognize that "a first admission will naturally lead to more inculpatory information."3 2 However, Elstad ignored Miranda's underlying premise
that an unwarned confession, coupled with the psychological pressures inherent
in a custodial interrogation, will likely taint later confessions. 3 3 The Elstad Court
decided that a suspect is capable of making an intelligent and voluntary decision
during the most pressured point of police inquiry. 4 The majority reasoned that
the warnings serve to remove any threat to inadmissibility.35 However, Justice
Brennan countered that "one of the factors that can vitiate the voluntariness of a
subsequent confession is the hopeless feeling of an accused that he has nothing to
24 See id. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing police practice of withholding Miranda
warnings until confession is made).
25 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 319 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
26 Id. at 319.
27 U.S. v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947).
28 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 326 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947).
29 U.S. v. Bayer, 331 U.S. at 540.
30 Id. at 540 ("[T]his Court has never gone so far as to hold that making a confession under
circumstances which preclude its use, perpetually disables the confessor from making a usable one
after those conditions have been removed.").
31 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
32 Id. at 328 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (if suspect gives a first confession it is reasonable to expect that it will lead to others and eventually to the full confession).
33 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 304-05; see The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L.
Rav. 141 (1985).
34 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318.
35 Id. at 314.
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lose by repeating his confession, even where the circumstances that rendered his
first confession illegal have been removed. 3 6
Several scholars agree with Justice Brennan and accuse the Court of dramatically narrowing Miranda'soriginal intent almost to the point of non-existence. 7
One commentator suggests that "many aspects of Miranda have become riddled
by exceptions, limitations, and very particularized factual inquiries."'38 Why
would the highest Court knowingly diminish-and yet not overrule outright-a
constitutional safeguard it once deemed essential? One commentator suggests
the U.S. Supreme Court is afraid to make a bold move to completely eviscerate
this legal landmark.39 That commentator suggests, "[w]hatever the reason for the
Court's hesitation, Elstad saps the Miranda requirements of much constitutional
and practical import."4° Consequently, although evidence produced through unconstitutional conduct is still inadmissible, a "simple" failure to administer Miranda warnings apparently does not offend justice, according to the Supreme
Court.

m.

STATE RESPONSES

In more than 450 state court opinions since 1970, state courts have interpreted
their constitutions to provide more protections than the U.S. Supreme Court's
interpretations of similar guarantees.4 ' Frequently, state courts rely on different
analytical approaches to their own state constitutions which provide broader constitutional protections than those afforded by the U.S. Supreme Court's Constitutional interpretations. Some twenty years ago, Justice Brennan called for state
36 Id. at 325 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Bayer, 331 U.S. at 540).
37

See Paul Marcus, A Return to the "Bright Line Rule" of Miranda, 35 W.i. &

MLARY

L REv.

93, 111 (1993):
"It has become increasingly evident that the principle of Miranda has largely given way to a
broader theme, one in which Fifth Amendment questions... are answered through a very

fact specific, case by case approach. [T]his development is most unfortunate for it limits much
of the great value of Miranda, a hard clear rule that all can understand."

See also The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L REv. 141 (1985) ("A majority
of the Court apparently no longer believes, as the Miranda Court did, that custodial interrogation is
inherently coercive."); Bettie E. Goldman, Oregon v. Elstad: Boldly Stepping Backward to Pre-Mi-

randaDays?, 35 CAT'H. L. Rav. 245,249 (1985) (Analysis of Elstadsuggests that the Supreme Court is
determined to narrow the Miranda doctrine).
38 See Marcus, supra note 36 at 112.
39 See The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 37 at 150 (-By ... retaining

the Miranda requirements, the Court may be simply evidencing a reluctance to engage in a frontal
assault on the most famous landmark of the Warren Court era and undermine the principles of stare

decisis.").
40

Id. at 151. "[A] majority of the court apparently no longer believes, as the Afiranda court did.

that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive."
41 WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §2.10, at 95 (2d ed. 1992).
See also V. Lakshmi Arimilli, Confessions and the Tennessee Constitution, 25 U, Mk. L REv. 637,

664 (1995).

68

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

judges and legal practitioners to scrutinize constitutional decisions by federal
courts because state courts followed a trend that provided their citizens with
42
broader protections under state constitutional law.
An analysis of state court decisions concerning the test for voluntariness of
confessions indicates that the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine applies only
to constitutional violations, and not to situations where police merely violate
prophylatic Miranda warnings. 43 The "fruit of the poisonous tree" analysis has
not applied to subsequent confessions that follow unwarned confessions absent a
constitutional violation."4 Instead, state courts apply the totality of circumstances
analysis to subsequent confessions made after Miranda warnings and a prior unwarned confession. 45 However, Elstad directs courts to admit statements that are
subsequent to prior unwarned confessions unless police use coercion or improper
police tactics.4 6 On the other hand, for a long time various state courts have
recognized that an unwarned admission automatically triggers a presumption of
compulsion. As a result, state courts apply the totality of the circumstances test
by looking to the factors surrounding all police conduct (including, significantly,
police violations of Miranda) and the second confession to determine whether
the subsequent confession was voluntary.47

42

William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protectionof Individual Rights, 90 HARy.

L. REV. 489, 495 (1977). See Arimilli supra note 41, at 664 (asserting that the Tennessee Supreme
Court has actively embraced the new federalism movement by protecting individual rights under state
constitutional law).
43 See notes 53-89 and accompanying text.
44 See United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947).
45 See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guaranteesof Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 552 (1986).

46 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314.
47 See, e.g., Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602 (1975); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
486 (1963); State v. Smith, 834 S.W.2d 915, 919 (1992).
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A majority of states follow the Elstad holding for a variety of reasons.4 s Some

states have not had the opportunity to decide otherwise. 4 9 A trend that grants
citizens broader constitutional protections under their state constitutions than
those afforded under the federal counterpart has surfaced in various state court
decisions. 50 This trend exists in part because state courts retain the ultimate authority to interpret state law.5 '
Tennessee
Rather than adopt the Elstad rule, several state courts dispute the U.S.

Supreme Court's rationale that psychological and other pressures flowing from
an initial unwarned confession never leads a defendant to give subsequent, invol48 See, e.g., State v. Corbeil, 674 A.2d 454,459 (Conn. App. 1996) ('\Ve do not reject the principles addressed in Elstad under our state constitution."); People v. Davis, 497 N.Y.S. 2d. 576, 581
(1985) ("Now with the Supreme Court's rejection as to the cat-out-of-the-bag theory in Elstad, the
Second Circuit's holding... no longer encumbers or clouds state law in this area. Consequently...
the Court of Appeals rejected the 'cat-out-of-the-bag' theory."); Land v. State, 678 So2d 201 (Alaska
CL App. 1995) (appellant's apparent ignorance of the fact that an oral consent to search is as valid as
a written one does not make his oral consent involuntary); cf Connecticut v. Barrett. 479 U.S. 523,
530 (1987) (holding that accused who agreed to give an oral, but not a written, statement without
counsel had waived the right to counsel with regard to the oral statement. The Court quoted Elstad
and observed. "[We have never 'embraced the theory that a defendant's ignorance of the full consequences of his decisions vitiates their voluntariness"'); Vermont v. Cleary, 641 A.2d. 102 (Vt. 1994):
To waive a right, a person need not have a thorough understanding of the potential legal
consequences flowing from it. Few defendants would have this level of understanding, and
factors other than intelligence-anxiety, temperament, feelings of guilt-could limit the capacity of others to fully appreciate the consequences of waiving their rights.
See also G. Blair McCune, Self-Incrimination Protection Under the Alaska Constitution: A Descriptive
Analysis, 12 ALAsA L. Rnv. 43,45 (1995) (Alaska courts have not had an opportunity to decide the
Elstad issue).
49 See, e.g., State v. Allenby, 847 P.2d I (Wash. CL App. 1992) (declining to review Elstad
under state law because prior case law specifically held that state constitution protection against selfincrimination was not broader than the Fifth Amendment); Halberg v. Alaska, 903 P.2d at 1090, 1093
(1995) (court found it unnecessary to resolve the issue of whether to apply pre-Elstadlaw).
50 See Lohraff, supra note 8, at 336.
51 See Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 120-21 (1975); see Brown v. Mississippi. 297 U.S. 278,
285 (1936) ("The state is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with its own conceptions of policy, unless in so doing it offends some principles of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people to be ranked fundamental."); State v. Gonzalez, 853 P.2d 526, 529

(Alaska 1993) (noting the "intention and spirit of our local Constitutional language" helps the state to
determine the federal constitution.); State v. Hicks, 428 S.E.2d 167 (N.C. 1993) (noting that in construing provisions of the Constitution of North Carolina, this Court is not bound by opinions of the
Supreme Court of the United States.); State v. Pebria, 938 P.2d at 176 ("Although we are not permitted to afford the defendant less rights than are afforded by the holding of Oregon v. Elstad,we are not
required to comply with its dicta."); see State v. Smith, 834 S.W. 2d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 1992) ("[T]his
court has previous declined to hold that protection under the state constitution is broader than that of
the federal constitution merely because the language of the two provisions are not the same."); see
E/stad, 470 U.S. at 363, n. 44 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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untary and incriminating statement. 52 For example, as a matter of state constitutional law, Tennessee has recognized that after illegally obtaining an
incriminating statement from a defendant, the state must establish that a subsequent confession was given voluntarily and that the confession was not the product of psychological pressures stemming from the previous statement.5 3 In State
v. Smith,54 the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the principles expressed in
United States v. Bayer by recognizing that, "after an accused55has.., let the cat out
of the bag

. .

. [hie can never let the cat back in the bag."

Like the Court in Bayer, the Smith Court refused to hold that an initial, illegally-obtained confession forever bars the prosecution from obtaining a subsequent, admissible confession from the defendant. 56 Rather, the Court recognized
"that an extraction of an illegal, unwarned confession from a defendant raises a
rebuttable presumption that a subsequent confession, even if proceeded by
' To correctly deterproper Mirandawarnings, is tainted by the initial illegality." 57
mine whether the subsequent confession is truly knowing and voluntary, a court
58
must look to the circumstances surrounding the two proximate confessions.
52 See Arimilli, supra note 41, at 666.
53 See State v. Smith, 834 S.W.2d 915, 919-20 (Tenn. 1992)
The provisions of ...
the Tennessee Constitution mandate that the State, after illegally
obtaining an incrimination statement from a defendant, must establish that the subsequent
confession was given freely and voluntarily and that the constitutional right to self-incrimination was not waived due solely to the psychological pressures resulting from giving the previous statement.
See also State v. Crump, 834 S.W.2d 265, 269 (Tenn. 1992) (finding that a subsequent confession
"clearly constituted an impermissible resumption of custodial interrogation which caused the [previous] admissions ... inadmissible.").
54 State v. Smith, 834 S.W.2d 915 (Tenn. 1992).
55 Id. at 919 (quoting Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947)):
[A]fter an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no matter what the
inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of
having confessed. He can never let the cat back in the bag. The secret is out for good. In
such a sense, a later confession always may be looked upon as fruit of the first.
See also Arimilli, supra note 41, at 662.
56 Smith, 834 S.W.2d at 919.
57 Id. The court noted, however, that the presumption can be overcome if the prosecution establishes that the taint was diminished enough to justify admission of the subsequent confession. Id.
(citing Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at 335 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
58 Id. The Smith Court listed nine factors courts should consider when determining the admissibility of confessions:
1) The use of coercive tactics to obtain the initial, illegal confession and the causal connection between the illegal conduct and the challenged, subsequent confession;
2) The temporal proximity of the prior and subsequent confessions;
3) The reading and explanation of Miranda rights to the defendant before the subsequent
confession;
4) The circumstances occurring after the arrest and continuing up until the making of the
subsequent confession including, but not limited to, the length of the detention and the
deprivation of food, rest, and bathroom facilities;
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Massachusetts
Relying on state constitutional law, the Massachusetts Supreme Court also
ruled that trial courts should consider the circumstances surrounding two confessions to determine whether an illegally-obtained confession so taints a subse-

quent confession as to render it inadmissible. 9 The Massachusetts Supreme
Court articulated two approaches in order to determine whether the taint from
an illegal interrogation has been eliminated, and whether a subsequent statement
is admissible: (1) the court must look for a "break in the stream of events...
'sufficient to insulate the [subsequent I statement from the effect of all that went
before"' and (2) the court must measure the effect of the previous statement on
the defendant's will. 61 The Massachusetts Court presumed that an accused's admission or confession of guilt obtained in violation of Miranda so taints any subsequent confessions that giving Miranda warnings does not dissipate its
strength.61 Inherent in Massachusetts case law are interpretations that provide
broad protections to criminal defendants. 62 Therefore, the presumption that a
statement made in violation of a suspect's Miranda rights taints a subsequent
confession requires the prosecution to carry the burden of dispelling the taint.63
Moreover, the Massachusetts Supreme Court noted that the presumption of a
taint is intended to discourage police from sidestepping the Miranda
requirement. 6 4
5) The coerciveness of the atmosphere in which any questioning took place including, but
not limited to, the place where the questioning occurred, the identity of the interrogators,
the form of the question, and the repeated or prolonged nature of the questioning;

6) The presence of intervening factors including, but not limited to, consultations with counsel or family members, or the opportunity to consult with counsel, if desired;
7) The psychological effect of having already confessed, and whether the defendant was ad.

vised that the prior confession may not be admissible at trial:
8) Whether the defendant initiated the conversation that led to the subsequent confession;
and
9) The defendant's sobriety, education, intelligence level, and experience with the law, as
such factors relate to the defendant's ability to understand the administered Miranda

rights.
Id at 919-20. No single factor alone is enough to determine admissibility, rather, courts should look to

the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 920.
59

Commonwealth v. Smith, 593 N.E.2d at 1292.

60 Id. (quoting Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 710 (1967). See also Darin v. Connecticut, 391
U.S. 346, 351 (1968).
61 Smith, 593 N.E.2d at 1295 (quoting Commonwealth v. Haas, 369 N.E.2d 692 (Mass. 1977)).

62 Id. at 1295-96.
63

See id. "The wiser course, we believe, is to presume that a statement made following the

violation of a suspect's Miranda rights is tainted, and to require the prosecution (to] show more than
the belated administration of Mirandawarnings in order to dispel that taint."
64 Id at 1292.
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Hawaii
With less vigor than Tennessee and Massachusetts, Hawaii extended its Bill of
Rights by excluding statements made after an unwarned confession. In State v.
Pebria,65 the court articulated two exceptions (to the Bayer rational) that automatically exclude tainted statements.6 6 In Hawaii, a confession made subsequent
to an illegally obtained one is not automatically and permanently inadmissible,
except when (1) the subsequent statement is a product of police coercion; or (2)
when a significant correlation exists between the two statements to find the ef67
fects of a taint.
Pebriaexpressed concerned about the Ninth Circuit's general approach to Miranda. The Pebria court accused the Ninth Circuit of changing the essential inquiry from the "fruit of the poisonous tree" to one of voluntariness. 6 The court
determined that Elstad intentionally ignored the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine and the consequences of an illegally-obtained confession and thus afforded the accused less protection. 6 9 Hawaii shunned the Elstad holding and affords greater constitutional protection to criminal defendants. 70 Hawaii's twopart theory considers any statement that follows improper Miranda warnings
inadmissible unless the government can demonstrate the statement was not obtained by exploitation of the first statement. That theory requires the government to prove that any connection between the two statements was so attenuated
that it dissipates the taint.71 In addition, Hawaii follows Elstad's dissent which
opposes the majority's dismissal of the psychological
compulsion inherent in cus72
todial interrogation as a factor in the waiver.
North Carolina
North Carolina has shown a willingness to apply the totality of the circumstances test in opposition to the Elstad decision.73 While North Carolina has
shown some deference to the U.S. Supreme Court's constitutional interpretations
that parallel its own constitutional provisions, it maintains that it is not bound to
do so. 74 At the same time, the North Carolina court noted that its decision in
65

938 P.2d 1190 (Haw. App. 1997).

66 Id. at 1194.
67
68
69
70

Id. See State v. Medeiros, 665 P.2d 181, 184 (Haw. App. 1983).
Pebria,938 P.2d. at 1196.
Id.
Id.

71 Id.
72 Id.
73 State v. Hicks, 428 S.E.2d 167, 176 (N.C. 1993).
74 Id. "We note that in construing provisions of the Constitution of North Carolina, this Court
is not bound by opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States construing even identical provisions in the Constitution of the United States." Id. North Carolina has a clause in its constitution that
parallels the guarantee of the Fifth Amendment. The language of Article I § 23 of the North Carolina
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State v. Hicks7 5 may be subject to change in later cases as it struggles with Elstad's requirement of excluding evidence unless the evidence violates the U.S.
Constitution.76 The North Carolina court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court
should not have the power to dictate what evidence states should exclude from
trial.77 Unless the use of evidence violates the federal constitution, the U.S.
Supreme Court should not require the exclusion of evidence from a criminal
trial. 7 8 "[W]e must assume that states are required by Miranda to exclude unwarned statements resulting from custodial interrogation only because such an
exclusion is required by the Constitution of the United States."79
Given the right circumstances, North Carolina may decide not to follow Elstad's lead.8 0 North Carolina identifies the compulsion factor that is present
when Miranda warnings are absent.8 ' The North Carolina court recognized that,
even when warnings are administered, the compulsion can continue notwithstanding an ostensibly knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of rights.2
Alaska
The Alaska courts interpret their state constitution more broadly than the
United States Constitution thus providing broader criminal rights in all areas except self-incrimination. 83 In Alaska's constitution, the self-incrimination proviconstitution differs from that of the Fifth Amendment but "both provisions guarantee an accused the

right to be free from compelled self-incrimination." Hicks, 428 S.E.2d at 176; see State v. Arrington,
311 N.C. 633, 642 (1984).
75 428 S.E.2d 167 (1993).
76 Id. at 175-76 (1993).
77 Id at 175 (citing Elstad's dissent).
We respectfully suggest that even the Supreme Court of the United States does not have the
constitutional authority - even though it may have the raw power - to require that this or
any other state court exclude evidence from a criminal trial, unless the use of that evidence
violates the Constitution of the United States.
Id
78 Id. at 175.
79 Id.
80 Id. "[W]e must assume that states are required by Airanda to exclude unwarned statements
resulting from custodial interrogation only because such an exclusion is required by the Constitution
of the United States." Perhaps the court would find an opportunity to exclude evidence that does not
violate the Constitution, but is obviously a result of an involuntary and unintelligent waiver of Miranda. Id
81 Id.at 176.
82 Hicks, 428 S.E.2d at 177. "The proper tests to be used in resolving questions arising under
the Constitution of North Carolina can be determined with finality only by this Court." Id. at 177
(citing Arrington, 311 N.C. at 643).
83 AiAsKA CONsT. art 1 §9 ("No person shall be compelled in any criminal proceeding to be a
witness against himself."). See McCune, at 48, supra note 48. -Alaska courts have not developed an
extensive self-incrimination analysis distinct from the federal standard. Nor have they granted
broader protection under the Alaska Constitution's self-incrimination provisions than the federal
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sions are consistent with the federal ones. 84 Alaska's only exception arises in
cases where the court demonstrates concern about its own ability to adequately
protect the rights of an accused.' 5 Although its courts have not ruled on the
Elstad issue, it is not likely that Alaska would follow the U.S. Supreme Court's
ruling. 6 One scholar notes that Alaska's preference for bright-line rules suggests
that the Alaska Supreme Court "would reject the Elstad approach as a matter of
constitutional law.",8 7 "[I]t remains to be seen how the Alaska Supreme Court
will rule on the Elstad issue. However, applying the Elstadrule could require the
type of 'taint' hearings that the Alaska Supreme Court viewed with disfavor in its
own State v. Gonzalez."88 Tune will tell what Alaska will do.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Oregon v. Elstad, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a suspect who has once
responded to unwarned yet uncoercive police questioning is not disabled from
waiving his right against self-incrimination after he has been given the requisite
Miranda warnings. The Court pointed out that, while Miranda warnings are
meant to protect a suspect from possible Fifth Amendment violations, the Fifth
Amendment in no way mandates that such warnings be given. Inherent in the
Elstad decision is the Court's belief that a failure to administer Miranda warnings
does not, by itself, constitute a Constitutional violation. Rather, such a failure
constitutes a mere violation of criminal procedure.
An analysis of subsequent state court decisions regarding the voluntariness of
confessions indicates that Elstad delivered a potentially crippling blow to Miranda and the ability of courts to safeguard the rights of persons accused of a
crime, with respect to successive confessions. As a result of potential restrictions
to the Mirandaprinciples, various state courts have refused to evaluate successive
confessions under the "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine." Rather, the trend in
determining the voluntariness of confessions in state courts has been to consider
the totality of circumstances surrounding the confessions. Relying on principles
set forth in U.S. v. Bayer, state courts that have adopted the totality of circumstances test have recognized that once an accused has let the cat out of the bag by
confessing, he is never free from the psychological pressures of having confessed.
Therefore, applying the rationale of state courts like Massachusetts, Tennessee
and Hawaii, practitioners in jurisdictions that have yet to adopt Elstad or have
standard unless the ability of the judicial fact-finding process to protect a criminal defendant's rights
against self-incrimination is in question." Id.
84 See McCune, at 48, supra note 48.
85 Id. at 71.

86 Id. at 67
87 Id.
88 Gonzalez, 853 P.2d 526, 530 (Alaska 1993) (ruling that use and derivative use immunity
would remove the hazard of self-incrimination).
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reluctantly done so, might find increased judicial tolerance of the time-tested
principles stated in Bayer that focus on the psychological pressures associated
with police interrogations.

